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Giving recently bankrupt cardholders new 
credit lines may not be a bad strategy, consid-
ering the way they use the cards and the fact 
that they can't refile for bankruptcy for six 
years. 
Bankruptcy in a Bank 
Credit Card Portfolio 
A. CHARLENE SULLIVAN 
DEBRA DRECNIK WORDEN 
While credit losses are a cost of doing busi-
ness for credit card issuers, the recent trend in 
nonbusiness bankruptcy raises concerns about 
the predictability of future bad debts. The dollar 
value of charged-off accounts is rising faster 
than outstandings, and losses due to bankruptcy 
are rising even more rapidly. From 1980 to 1990, 
average net chargeoffs increased from 2.92% to 
3.51 % of outstandings on Visa credit cards. 
Bankruptcy losses climbed to 43% of net charge-
offs in 1990, up from 27% in 1980. While interest 
spreads for bank cards have been sufficient to 
absorb increased credit losses for the largest 
card issuers, the threat of the bankruptcy "wild 
card" makes the expected economic benefits of 
A. Charlene Sullivan teaches at the Krannert Graduate 
School of Management, Purdue University, and Debra Drec-
nik Worden is with Olivet Nazarene University. 
bank credit cards very uncertain for smaller is-
suers, issuers offering low interest rates, and 
those with high operating costs or a high cost of 
funds. 
This research examines the card use of credit 
cardholders who filed bankruptcy in the first 
five months of 1991. (This period was selected 
because of data availability. There is no reason 
to believe that the results will be biased by this 
limitation on the analysis.) Measures of their ac-
tivity and profitability in the calendar year prior 
to chargeoff are analyzed and compared to 
equivalent measures for accounts charged off 
due to severe delinquency, as well as to those for 
a random sample of credit card accounts. The 
question addressed is: How do bankruptcies dif-
fer from delinquency chargeoffs? After describ-
ing various dimensions of the card use behavior 
of the two groups, the paper contains a multi-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
variate analysis of factors associated with bor-
rowers' choices between bankruptcy and out-
right default, including legal conditions that 
define lenders' rights to debtors' income and as-
sets inside and outside bankruptcy court. The 
paper addresses the extent of the "abusive or 
unnecessary bankruptcy" in the portfolio. Fur-
ther, an estimate of the expected profitability of 
providing new credit cards to bankrupts is pre-
sented. 
Lenders are greatly concerned about the grow-
ing percentage of losses attributed to bankrupt-
cy. The trend is interpreted as an indication of 
an increasing nondiversifiable risk for credit 
card issuers and a decline in borrowers' sense of 
responsibility for debt repayment. Alternate in-
terpretations are that growing bankruptcy 
losses reflect the increased availability of unse-
cured credit to high-risk borrowers or an in-
crease in the probability that debtors in distress 
have multiple credit accounts and view bank-
ruptcy as a more efficient means of solving cred-
it problems than renegotiation with creditors or 
outright default. 
A Six-Year Hiatus 
From the borrower's point of view, to petition 
for bankruptcy or to simply default are alterna-
tive means of debt relief. The borrower's choice 
is expected to be that avenue which provides the 
greatest expected value of debts discharged, net 
of costs. Either action may have a negative im-
pact on the availability of future credit. But the 
borrower who files under Chapter 7 may not file 
again for six years, a factor that may enhance 
the market's perception of his or her future cre-
ditworthiness and so reduce the relative cost of 
bankruptcy. While this analysis considers only 
one of many credit contracts the distressed bor-
rowers may have had, it provides insights into 
the factors that influence debtors' choices of 
bankruptcy over outright default. 
The data analyzed reflect the activity in a 
large geographically diversified portfolio of 
standard bank credit cards in 1990 and the first 
five months of 1991. Cardholders in the portfo-
lio resided in each of the 50 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. As an indication of the credit 
risk of the portfolio, about 2. 7% of accounts 
opened before Jan. 1, 1990, were charged off in 
1990 with net dollars lost equal to 4.69% of aver-
age outstandings. 1 Twenty-eight percent of 
charged-off accounts were due to bankruptcy, 
45% were due to severe delinquency, 1.5% re-
sulted from the death of the cardholder, and 24 % 
were attributed to fraud. 2 While bankrupts 
made up 28% of charged-off accounts, they were 
responsible for 34% of the estimated net dollars 
charged off, with only 2% of bankrupts making a 
payment after chargeoff, compared with 19% of 
the delinquency group. 
The sample of accounts analyzed includes all 
standard accounts charged off in the first five 
months of 1991 after bankruptcy or severe de-
linquency. These accounts were analyzed rela-
tive to a random sample of active accounts that 
were open before 1990 and remained open 
throughout that year. For most of the analysis, 
this sample was further reduced to those ac-
counts open before 1990 - thus providing a full 
12 months of activity for all accounts analyzed. 
The greatest risk of loss occurs early in the life 
of the account (Table 1 ). Charged-off accounts 
had an average life of about 27 months, while 
that for open accounts was 55 months.3 Less 
than 5% of charged-off accounts had been open 
for more than 60 months, compared with about 
one-third of open accounts. The cardholders rep-
resented by the charged-off accounts were more 
likely to be very young (25 or younger) than the 
open accounts. But, on average, cardholders 
with open accounts were only slightly older than 
cardholders with charged-off accounts (41 ver-
sus 38). The distributions of life of the accounts 
and age of cardholders were significantly differ-
ent for bankrupt and delinquency chargeoff 
groups. 
Almost 40% of open accounts had credit lines 
above $3,000, in contrast to about 20% of bank-
rupt accounts and 14% of the delinquency 
chargeoffs. But the greatest distinction between 
the open and charged-off accounts was in the 
percentages with credit lines in excess of $4,500 
(13% of open accounts versus 2% to 2.5% of the 
charged-off groups). Some of the size disparity 
could be attributed to lenders' assessment of the 
credit risk of the charged-off accounts. But since 
the credit line typically grows over the life of an 
account, the differences in credit-line sizes may 
also be attributable to the difference in account 
lives for the two groups. 
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Table 1: Analysis of Charged-Off Accounts 
Accounts Open Accounts Charged Off in 1991 
Characteristics Throughout 1990 Bankruptcy Delinquency 
Mean Account, 
Life (months) 55 26 27 
< 12 months 4.0% 5.0% 4.6% 
13-24 23.5 48.1 53.6 
25-60 41.8 43.1 37.3 
>60 months 30.7 3.8 4.5 
x2=12.8* 
Mean Cardholder 
Age (years) 41 38 38 
<=22 0.8% 1.90/o 1.1% 
23-25 7.8 9.0 11.9 
26-35 34.6 37.4 39.3 
36-45 25.2 29.1 24.7 
46-55 14.2 13.0 13.6 
56-65 8.7 6.3 5.1 
>65 8.7 3.3 4.3 
X2= 17.3* 
Mean Credit Line $2886 $2398 $2270 
<=$1000 5.7% 6.5% 7.3% 
$1001-1500 18.1 24.3 30.2 
$1501-2000 9.6 11.5 12.0 
$2001-2500 14.9 25.8 23.6 
$2501-3000 13.1 12.4 12.5 
$3001-4500 25.7 17.0 12.3 
>4500 12.9 2.5 2.1 
X2=23.4* 
Number of accounts 8484 1146 2025 
(opened prior to 1990) 
*Distributions of bankrupts and delinquents are signlficantl~lfferent at the 95% level of confidence. 
1Whereas most of the a~is was for accounts opened fore 1990, the life distribution Includes 
accounts open during 1 as well. 
The size of credit lines held by the bankruptcy 
charge-off group was distributed differently 
from that of the delinquency group. The bank-
rupt accounts were more likely to have credit 
lines above $3,000. The average life of the ac-
counts was also distributed differently for the 
two charge-off groups, with the bankrupts being 
somewhat more likely to have had their accounts 
more than 24 months. Cardholders in the bank-
rupt group had probably been judged, on aver-
age, to be of better credit quality than those in 
the delinquency group by the card issuer. This 
difference is not totally unexpected, as the ma-
jority of bankruptcies are associated with unex-
pected changes in financial circumstances, con-
ditions that could befall cardholders from a wide 
range of economic circumstances. 
The charged-off accounts differed significant-
ly from the open accounts along all usage dimen-
sions (Table 2). They were more likely to re-
volve, and revolved most of the year. Charged-
off account holders used an average of about 
78% of their available line versus about 39% for 
the open accounts. The charged-off groups were 
about five times more likely to have been over 
limit in 1990 than the open accounts and were 
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Table 2: Analysis of Charged-Off Accounts by Usage 
Accounts Open Accounts Charged Off in 1991 
1990 Activity Measures Throughout 1990 Bankruptcy Delinquency 
Revolve 75.1% 100% 100% 
Proportion of 1990 Revolved .80 .98 .as· 
% Credit Line Used 38.7% 87.3% 68.4%* 
Average Daily Balance $945 $2074 $1543* 
High Balance/Credit Line 52.3% 99.5% 79.5%* 
Used Cash Advance 22.6% 45.6% 26.2%* 
Average Amount of Advances $759 $725 $676 
Overlimit 11.7% 57.4% 50.1%* 
Proportion of 1990 Overlimit .20 .35 .46* 
Delinquent 43.3% 95.9% 100%* 
Proportion of 1990 Delinquent .25 .54 .67* 
1990 Delinquency History 
Never delinquent 56.7% 4.1% 0% 
> 0 <= 3 months 30.0 21.6 2.9 
> 3 months < = 9 months 12.3 53.4 65.0 
> 9 months 1.0 20.9 32.1 
*Statistics for bankrupts and delinquents are significantly different at 95% level of confidence. 
considerably more likely to use cash advances 
than the open accounts. However, the mean dol-
lar amount of their total cash advances was not 
significantly different from that for the open ac-
counts ($694 vs. $759). 
The bankrupts used their accounts more ag-
gressively than the delinquents on every activi-
ty dimension with the most pronounced differ-
ence being in cash advance usage. The bankrupts 
were almost twice as likely to use cash advances, 
though the average dollar value of cash ad-
vances did not differ across the two groups 
($725 vs. $676). Their active use of cash ad-
vances might have provided an early warning of 
bankruptcy. If a cardholder is using a credit card 
as a temporary substitute for lost wages or 
drawing on one card to keep other credit obliga-
tions current, there could be substantial cash ad-
vance activity. Or a cardholder could use cash 
advances to draw down the credit line in antici-
pation of bankruptcy, although discharge of 
such debt obligations could be disallowed by the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
The chargeoff accounts were more likely to 
have been delinquent than the open accounts, re-
gardless of the reason for charge off. Almost 
96% of bankrupts had been delinquent in 1990. 
On average, they had been delinquent for slight-
ly more than half the year. It is safe to conclude 
that many of the bankrupts would have ulti-
mately been charged off because of chronic de-
linquency. But since they are able to continue 
collection efforts after a delinquency chargeoff 
but not after bankruptcy, lenders suffer more 
from chargeoff due to bankruptcy than from 
chargeoff due to chronic delinquency. Because 
late payments actually precipitated their official 
chargeoff, all the delinquency chargeoffs had 
been delinquent in 1990 and for an average of al-
most two-thirds of the year. 
A substantial percentage of bankrupts did not 
have serious repayment problems (on this par-
ticular card) in the calendar year before filing. 
About 4% of bankrupts had not been delinquent 
at all in 1990, and another 22% had been delin-
quent for three months or less. But about 21 % 
had been delinquent more than nine months. 
The Abusive Bankrupt. Lenders report that 
they receive bankruptcy notices from borrowers 
who have never been delinquent. This suggests 
that borrowers may be legally voiding debts 
through bankruptcy when debt relief is not nee-
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essary. A 1982 analysis estimated that about 
20% of bankrupts who filed under Chapter 7 of 
the Bankruptcy Code had the ability to repay all 
their debts out of disposable income in less than 
three years. 4 By filing under Chapter 7, all their 
disposable income was protected from unse-
cured lenders' claims. Unpredictable or unneces-
sary bankruptcy is particularly threatening for 
unsecured lenders, whose claims are generally 
discharged completely in Chapter 7. 
Do accounts that were in bankruptcy after a 
short delinquency represent abusive or unneces-
sary bankruptcies?5 An analysis of the 25% of 
bankrupt accounts that had been the least delin-
quent revealed that, relative to the average 
bankrupt, these had larger credit lines (an aver-
age of $2,521, with 25% having credit lines 
above $3,000 and 4% with lines greater than 
$4,500), were slightly older accounts (average 
life of 29 months), and represented cardholders 
with higher average age ( 42 years). The least de-
linquent were dramatically more likely to use 
cash advances (about 62% ) than the average 
bankrupts. Further, they used an average of six 
cash advances in 1990 versus between two and 
three for the other bankrupts. In fact, there was 
little difference in the cash-advance usage of de-
linquency and bankruptcy chargeoffs when the 
least delinquent bankrupts were excluded from 
the analysis. 
Since these data reflect only activity on one 
card, it is not possible to conclude that these 
bankruptcies were unnecessary. However, their 
cash-advance activity certainly distinguished 
this group from the rest of the bankrupts and 
suggests some measure of "loading up" before 
bankruptcy. 6 
Given their heavy use of the credit card and 
the high level of fees associated with exceeding 
credit limits and missing payments, the char-
geoff accounts generated attractive cash flows 
in the year before their charge off. The average 
net contribution before taxes per open account 
was $76.75, while that for the bankrupt and de-
linquency chargeoffs was $185.46 and $147.26 
respectively (Table 3). The average annual prof-
itability per account for each group of accounts 
was calculated based on actual interest paid, 
fees, and merchant interchange earned, net of in-
terest expense, estimated at 8.16%, and operat-
ing costs, estimated at 6.25% of the average 
balance. 
The average net contribution before losses on 
accounts that were charged off demonstrates 
that, with limits on their ability to default again, 
these cardholders may be attractive targets for 
new credit. Unlike the delinquency chargeoff, 
the bankruptcy chargeoff is legally prohibited 
from filing bankruptcy again for six years, a fac-
tor that may effectively reduce their credit risk 
for that period. And this factor does seem to be 
taken into account in the credit marketplace. A 
recent study demonstrated that 20% of bank-
rupts had a new unsecured credit line within 12 
Table 3: Profit Analysis of Charged-Off Accounts 
Accounts Open Accounts Charged Off in 1991 due to: 
Profitability in 1990 Throughout 1990 Bankruptcy Delinquency 
(mean values) 
Interest Margin $86.83 $220.67 $167.90 
Fee Income 24.62 63.97 53.39 
Interchange 13.49 5.07 3.50 
Operating Expense 48.19 104.25 77.53 
Net Contribution1 76.75 185.46 147.26 
Estimated Net Chargeoff 0 2342.06 1770.31 
tThe figures for net contribution do not include any loss expense as none of the accounts analyzed 
here were charged off in 1990. The net contribution for all standard cards, including those charged 
off or closed in 1990, was $29.68. 
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months of their bankruptcy filing and that 60% 
had new credit within five years. 7 
The data on the annual profitability of the 
bankrupt accounts in this sample are used to as-
sess whether there is value created by this strat-
egy. Assume that the credit demands of people 
who file bankruptcy will not change after their 
bankruptcy. Assume further that the size of 
their credit line stays constant. And assume that 
15 % of bankrupts will file again at the end of the 
six years, the waiting period required by law.8 
With an average balance of $2,074 and annual 
net earnings of $185.46 per account, the expect-
ed net present value (discounted at 8% per year) 
for six years of activity equals $397. Given the 
assumptions stated, it makes economic sense to 
give a new unsecured credit line to a previously 
bankrupt account holder. However, the results 
would be different if, after the first bankruptcy, 
the cardholder attempted to minimize overlimit 
and delinquency fees, or the probability of re-
peat bankruptcy increased. Further, this analy-
sis takes the view that providing credit to bank-
rupts will not affect the probability of 
bankruptcy in the overall population of borrow-
ers. If, however, the strategy communicates to 
other borrowers that there is no stigma to bank-
ruptcy, it may well prove counterproductive. 
Choosing to File 
The distressed debtor who has not filed bank-
ruptcy in the previous six years is free to default 
outright or file bankruptcy to gain relief from 
debts. The borrower's choice is a function of the 
expected value of debts discharged, net of costs, 
including assets or income forfeited, and any re-
sidual effect the action might have on the future 
availability of credit. This data set provides a 
unique opportunity to empirically evaluate the 
factors that influence distressed borrowers' 
choices between default and bankruptcy. 
Borrowers' choices between bankruptcy and 
default are expected to vary with their age (a 
proxy for number and variety of credit con-
tracts) and size of debt obligations (as measured 
by size of credit line), with the probability that 
the distressed debtor chooses bankruptcy in-
creasing with both variables. Young borrowers 
with fewer credit contracts and borrowers with 
smaller credit lines are expected to have less 
need for court protection than older borrowers 
with more varied contracts and borrowers with 
larger credit obligations. 
Borrowers' choices are also expected to reflect 
factors related to the life of the account and the 
way the account was used. Holding other things 
constant, debtors who have maintained success-
ful credit relations for some period of time and 
then experience financial difficulty are expected 
to be more likely to file bankruptcy than to de-
fault outright. And borrowers who use a large 
number of cash advances or who consistently 
use a high percentage of their credit line are ex-
pected to be more likely to file bankruptcy than 
to default. These behaviors may be attributed to 
"loading up" the line of credit in anticipation of 
bankruptcy or to the use of the credit line as a 
substitute for lost earnings. 
To evaluate the determinants of borrowers' 
choices (measured as a 0/1 variable, where 1 
equals the bankruptcy choice and 0 is default), a 
multivariate logit model was employed. The re-
sulting maximum likelihood equation estimates 
the probability that a distressed debtor will 
choose bankruptcy over default. Explanatory 
variables in the model included measures of the 
legal environment of the debtors' states concern-
ing creditors' rights to debtors' assets and in-
come, the age of the cardholder, the life of the 
account, the size of credit line, and measures of 
how the card was used in the year before char-
geoff - the number of cash advances taken and 
the average balance as a percentage of the credit 
line. 
The creditors' ability to garnishee wages is 
measured by two 0/1 variables. The variable 
"Restricted Garnishment" takes the value of 1 
for those states where more wages are protected 
from garnishment than is provided by the Feder-
al Consumer Protection Act.9 The variable "Pro-
hibited Garnishment"' takes the value 1 for 
those states where 100% of the debtor's wages 
are protected from garnishment for payment of 
consumer credit. 1° Creditors' claim to debtors' 
assets in bankruptcy is measured by a 0/1 vari-
able that distinguishes states that provide a 
homestead exemption less than the Federal 
Bankruptcy Code homestead allowance of 
$ 7 ,500 per debtor .11 
The logit equation performed reasonably well 
in predicting the distressed debtor's choice of 
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Table 4: Logit Analysis of Debtor's Choice of Bankruptcy vs. Delinquency 
A. All Chargeoffs 
Estimated Absolute 
Independent Variables Coefficients t-Statistic 
Life of Account (months) 0.007* 1.97 
Age of Principal Cardholder (yrs.) 0.001 0.29 
Credit Line ($) 0.0002* 3.26 
% Credit Line Used in '90 0.018* 12.66 
# Cash Advances in '90 0.062* 4.84 
State Laws 
Restricted Garnishment -0.521* 5.72 
Prohibited Garnishment -0.665* 5.46 
Low As~t Exemption 0.266* 2.82 
Constant 2.367* 10.67 
Mean Proportion of Cardholders 
Choosing Bankruptcy 0.369 
N** 3098 
Model Significance (XZ) 324.97* 
Pseudo adjusted RZ 0.076 
• Significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
••Accounts opened in 1990 were included in this analysis. 
bankruptcy over default (Table 4A). He or she 
was significantly less likely to file bankruptcy in 
states where garnishment was prohibited or re-
stricted. Further, in states where the value of 
the asset exemption was lower than the federal 
exemption, distressed debtors were more likely 
to file bankruptcy than to default outright. In a 
separate analysis, an estimated 21% of bank-
rupts in low asset states filed under Chapter 13, 
vs. only 9% in other states. The difference was 
statistically significant. We also found that debt-
ors preferred Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 in states 
with low asset exemptions.12 
The debtor's choice did not vary significantly 
with age, but the probability of choosing bank-
ruptcy increased significantly with the size of 
the credit line. And, holding age and credit line 
constant, debtors with older accounts preferred 
bankruptcy to outright default. The coefficients 
for the number of cash advances and the per-
centage of credit line used throughout the year 
before chargeoff were both significant and pos-
itive. 
B. Exclude "Abusive" Bankruptcy 
Variable Estimated Absolute Variable 
Mean Coefficients t-Statistic Mean 
24.0 0.006 1.45 24.0 
37.8 -0.007 1.79 37.5 
2272 0.0002* 2.74 2257 
76.0 0.023* 12.84 75.7 
1.3 0.027 1.83 1.2 
0.37 -0.585* 5.77 0.37 
0.19 -0.613* 4.56 0.20 
0.27 0.318* 3.08 0.27 
1.0 2.721* 10.51 1.0 
0.302 
2800 
320.28* 
0.091 
To further investigate the phenomenon of 
"abusive or unnecessary bankruptcy," a sepa-
rate logit analysis of the choice between bank-
ruptcy and default was estimated, excluding all 
bankrupts that had been delinquent for less than 
three months in 1990 (Table 4B). In the analysis 
of the choices of cardholders who had all been 
severely delinquent in the year before chargeoff, 
the coefficient of the cash-advance variable de-
creased markedly in size and significance, sup-
porting our earlier sentiment that cash-advance 
usage was a distinguishing characteristic of the 
less severely delinquent bankrupt. The account 
life variable became insignificant, suggesting 
that the less severely delinquent bankrupts had 
been cardholders longer than the other bank-
rupts in the sample. 
The univariate analysis of the activity, profit-
ability, and delinquency measures for credit 
card accounts that had been charged off in 1991 
after severe delinquency or bankruptcy demon-
strated that, for the most part, bankruptcy 
chargeoffs were very similar to delinquency 
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chargeoffs. Both groups had been very active us-
ers of their credit lines and had generated aver-
age earnings before taxes that were more than 
double the earnings generated by the average ac-
count in the portfolio. And most of the bank-
rupts had been as severely delinquent in 1990 as 
the delinquency group. But our analysis suggests 
that, given the manner in which they used credit 
cards and the fact that filing bankruptcy bars 
them from exercising that option again for six 
years, as noted, the group of bankrupts may be 
an economically attractive target for new unse-
cured lines of credit after bankruptcy. 
The decision to file bankruptcy vs. outright 
default by cardholders with repayment prob-
lems was a function of the legal conditions in 
their state that govern lenders' ability to seize 
income and assets. In states where garnishment 
of wages was prohibited or restricted, debtors 
were more likely to default outright rather than 
file bankruptcy. In states where asset exemp-
tions in bankruptcy were more restricted than 
the federal exemption, debtors in trouble were 
more likely to file bankruptcy under Chapter 13 
than default outright. Holding those conditions 
constant, the probability of choosing bankrupt-
cy over outright default increased with the life 
and size of the credit account. Further, the prob-
ability of choosing bankruptcy was higher for 
account holders who had maintained a high av-
erage balance relative to their credit line or who 
had frequently used the cash-advance feature of 
their card. 
There is evidence that a substantial portion of 
the bankruptcy cases may have been abusive. 
That 25% of bankrupts who had been the least 
delinquent before chargeoff used an inordinate-
ly large number of cash advances before filing, 
had larger credit lines, and had been cardholders 
longer. While our ability to judge their motives 
on the basis of activities in only one of their cred-
it relationships may be limited, this group is dis-
tinctive from the other bankrupts in the portfo-
lio. Since they account for about 28% of 
bankruptcy losses in this portfolio, efforts to 
learn more about the validity of their bankrupt-
cy action may lead to substantial reductions in 
credit losses. 
Notes 
1. The statistics for 1990 are reported because a com-
plete year of data was not available for 1991, the year of 
chargeoff for the accounts analyzed in the paper. 
2. The reason for chargeoff was not ascertained for 2% 
of accounts charged off. 
3. Account life was measured by the number of months 
between the opening and chargeoff dates for charged-off ac-
counts and the number of months between the opening date 
and the current date (May 1991) for open accounts. 
4. R.W. Johnson and R.L. Peterson: "Consumers' Right 
to Bankruptcy: Origins and Effects," Credit Research Center, 
Purdue University, p. 57. 
5. Some of the accounts that had not been extremely de-
linquent in 1990 became more delinquent in 1991 before 
chargeoff. On average, however, these accounts were signifi-
cantly less delinquent before bankruptcy (in months) than 
the rest of the bankrupt accounts (4.8 months vs. 10.2 
months). 
6. The Bankruptcy Code provides that unsecured credit 
card debts incurred within 90 days of filing may be excluded 
from discharge in Chapter 7. 
7. Mike Staten: "Better Screening of Borrowers Can 
Stem Bankruptcy" American Banker, Jan. 15, 1991, p. 7. 
8. In a survey of people who filed bankruptcy under 
Chapter 7 in 1981, 15% said they would consider filing again 
in the future. Nine percent had already filed at least once. A. 
Charlene Sullivan: "Personal Bankruptcy: Causes, Costs, and 
Benefits," Credit Research Center, Purdue University, 1982. 
9. There were 25 states where garnishment was restrict-
ed in 1990. These are AL, AK, CT, DE, HI, IA, ID, IL, KS, LA, 
MA, MD, ME, MN, MO, NE, NH, NJ, NM, NY, OR, RI, VT, WV, 
WI. 
10. The states where garnishment was prohibited in 
1990 were FL, NC, ND, PA, SC, SD, TX. 
11. The states that enforced homestead allowances that 
were lower than the federal allowance were AL, AR, DE, GA, 
KY, MD, NE, NH, OH, OK, SC, TN, VA, WY. 
12. See A. Charlene Sullivan and Debra D. Worden, "The 
Law and Consumer Demand for Debt Relief Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code," unpublished manuscript, Purdue University, 
1991. 
